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ABSTRACT 
Since the period leading to and following the American election cycle of 2016, a variety of sources have 
warned that people in the U.S. are being exposed to fake news. In light of this problem, our study tested 
the effect of exposure to guidelines (for evaluating the credibility of news online) on a person’s 
assessment of real and fake news about climate change on Facebook. Through an online experiment (n = 
2,750 participants), we tested two conditions and a control. Those in our Guidelines condition read 
guidelines for evaluating news online while participants in our Enhanced Guidelines condition read the 
same guidelines and rated them in terms of how important each guideline would be for evaluating news 
online. The control group was not exposed to guidelines at all. Then, participants were shown a Facebook 
post containing either real or fake news about climate change and asked to evaluate the post in terms of its 
trustworthiness, and how likely they would be to like or share the post on Facebook. Our results show that 
participants in both conditions were less likely to trust, like, or share fake climate news compared to the 
control group. Encouragingly, these interventions did not reduce a participant’s likelihood to trust, like, or 
share real climate news. Both conditions had consistently small effect sizes for each dependent variable 
(trusting, liking, and sharing). However, even if exposure to guidelines only has a small chance of 
reducing a person’s likelihood to trust, like, or share fake news, that small probability could still provoke 
meaningful behavior change if a population as massive as all U.S. internet users were to experience our 
interventions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the period leading to and following the American election cycle of 2016, a variety of sources have 
warned that people in the U.S. are being exposed to “fake news”, referring to “news” that deliberately 
spreads fabricated information, mimics the format of legitimate reporting, and is intended to mislead its 
consumers (Lazer et al. 2018). Though not a new problem, the reach and potentially deleterious influence 
of fake news has been exacerbated by its prevalence on a wide range of social media platforms, and, the 
purported role of fake news in influencing voters during the 2016 election cycle has given the issue 
renewed attention (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017, Guess et al. 2018, Grinberg et al. 2019). Recent studies 
have approximated the reach and magnitude of fake news on social media. A conservative estimate is that 
the average American adult viewed between one and three fake news stories on social media in the month 
leading up to the 2016 election (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017). And a separate study of Twitter users 
estimated that fake news accounted for approximately 6% of total news consumption on social media 
(Grinberg et al. 2019).  
In light of this problem, researchers and media providers have been searching for ways to limit the reach 
and influence of fake news. One way to do so may be through arming internet users with the information 
they need to effectively assess the news they encounter online. Many webpages offer advice about how to 
detect fake news, or to evaluate the credibility of information online. Facebook, in its online help center, 
offers advice for spotting fake news1, including “be skeptical of headlines” and “investigate the source”; 
the public-facing Psychology Today offers2 similar advice. Our study sought to understand if familiarity 
with guidelines for evaluating the credibility of news, similar to those above, could make a person less 
likely to trust or engage with fake news on social media, specifically on Facebook.  
There are several reasons social media platforms have become effective conduits for the spread of false 
information. First, social media outlets typically do not police the accuracy or sources of content posted to 
their sites. Second, by nature of the platforms, information can be shared or promoted over and over, 
which gives information (true or false) the ability to spread very widely and very quickly. Indeed, there is 
evidence that false information is shared or promoted even more often than accurate information 
(Vousoughi et al. 2018). And third, social media sites are popular sources of news; 47% of Americans 
report that they use social media to check the news “sometimes” or “often” with Facebook being the most 
popular platform for this purpose (Shearer and Gottfried 2017).   
                                                        
1 https://www.facebook.com/help/188118808357379 
2 https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/socially-relevant/201711/how-spot-fake-news 
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Due to Facebook’s popularity as a news source and its widespread use in general, we focused our research 
on just this platform. In our study, we presented participants with fake news formatted as if it were news 
that had been posted to Facebook, or, a Facebook “post”. Although fake news on Facebook can “cover” 
any topic, we focused our research on fake news about climate change because of its importance to global 
environmental, social, and economic affairs. Fake news about climate change typically perpetuates 
falsehoods that climate change is not occurring, that it is not caused by human activities, or that it does 
not pose a threat to humans and the environment (Farrell et al. 2019). Therefore, our Facebook post 
stimuli contained content about climate change.  
To evaluate the effectiveness of guidelines in helping to inoculate against fake climate news, we asked 
participants to rate the trustworthiness of the information in the post. Then, to mimic the choices 
Facebook users encounter on the platform, participants were also asked how likely they would be to 
“like” or “share” the post. On Facebook, “liking” a post indicates interest in content, whereas “sharing” a 
post directly proliferates the content by showing it to more Facebook users. Likelihood to trust, like, or 
share the post were our main dependent variables in assessing the effectiveness of our interventions on 
fake news about climate change on Facebook.  
Prior research has offered two theories for why individuals may be susceptible to fake news. First, the 
messages imparted by fake news may align with deeply held political beliefs which, in turn, triggers 
identity protective cognition. People tend to be motivated to protect their beliefs from evidence to the 
contrary and may, therefore, align themselves with information that confirms what they already believe to 
be true or right (Kunda 1990, Nir 2011). Prior research suggests that when people are the recipients of 
fake news that is in line with their preexisting beliefs or values, they will be less motivated to engage in 
critical reflection about its accuracy (Taber and Lodge 2006, Allcott and Gentzkow 2017). Secondly, 
recent research has suggested that a general lack of critical thinking—independent of partisan 
motivations—is responsible for an individual’s susceptibility to fake news. Controlling for political 
ideology, Pennycook and Rand (2018) found that individuals who scored highly on an assessment of 
analytical reasoning ability were better able to distinguish between fake and real news headlines.  
In light of these findings, we were generally skeptical about the ability of mere exposure to guidelines to 
inoculate consumers against the effects of fake news; in our view, simple guidelines would not be 
powerful enough to overcome the partisan tug of motivated reasoning or the absence of critical thinking 
that may be common to consuming false information while absentmindedly scrolling through the 
Facebook interface. Thus, we hypothesized that people who read guidelines for spotting fake news 
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immediately before being exposed to inaccurate Facebook posts would be no less likely to trust, like, or 
share them when compared to a control group that did not receive the guidelines. 
We did, however, speculate that encouraging people to more deeply process guidelines could prove 
powerful enough to subsequently influence their perceptions of fake news about climate change, in terms 
of trusting, liking, and sharing. Therefore, we created a second intervention—which we called enhanced 
guidelines—where participants, along with reading the guidelines, were asked to rate the importance of 
each in terms of helping to determine the credibility of news received on Facebook. In the same way that 
attribute weighting tools in research on decision support help people to make better calibrated decisions 
(in terms of their needs and priorities) (Gregory et al. 2016, Bessette et al. 2019), we hypothesized that 
rating individual guidelines would help people to process them more deeply; this, in turn, would lead 
people to trust, like, and share fake news less when compared to a control group. 
In addition to testing these interventions on fake news, we also tested them on news about climate change 
that was accurate. We did so to address concerns that any positive results with respect to inoculating 
people against fake news would be counterbalanced by also encouraging people to distrust legitimate 
reporting about climate change.  
Finally, we also included a series of covariates in our research. First, given ideological differences in 
public perceptions of climate change, we tested whether the effectiveness of guidelines and enhanced 
guidelines differed across both climate change skeptics and believers, and political conservatives and 
liberals. Second, we included an individual’s level of knowledge about climate change as a covariate; we 
hypothesized that participants who were more knowledgeable would be more discerning consumers of 
our fake news stimulus. Third, we measured participants’ general disposition—negative or positive—
toward Facebook as a covariate, speculating that a positive attitude toward the social media platform 
would lead people to view all posts as more trustworthy regardless of their accuracy. Additionally, we 
measured whether or not participants recognized the sources of the news posts. We hypothesized that 
climate doubters, who are more likely to be politically conservative, would be more likely to trust the fake 
news if they recognized the source, since they may have positive preconceived notions of sources with 
far-right reputations. On the other hand, we expected climate believers to be less likely to trust the fake 
news if they recognized the source due to negative preconceived notions. For real news, all sources had 
non-partisan reputations, so we hypothesized that recognizing the source would lead to a higher 
likelihood of trusting, liking, or sharing the post. We ended our experiment with standard demographic 
questions which covered gender, age, and education level.  
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METHODS 
Design  
Our study adopted a 3 ⨉ 2 experimental design involving two fake news interventions (Guidelines and 
Enhanced Guidelines) and a control (no intervention), and two types of news about climate change (fake 
and real). Participants were randomly assigned to just one of the six possible experimental variations, and 
their progression through the experimental design followed the same sequence of tasks.  
Conditions. Participants in the control condition were informed that they would view a Facebook post 
about climate change, and then be asked to answer questions about what they saw.  
In the Guidelines condition, participants were informed that they would view a Facebook post about 
climate change. Next, they were asked to consider a series of four questions (i.e., the guidelines) that 
would help them to evaluate the credibility of news online The questions were: (1) Do I recognize the 
news organization that posted the story?; (2) Does the information in the post seem believable?; (3) Is the 
post written in a style that I expect from a professional news organization?; and (4) Is the post politically 
motivated? These guidelines reflected common recommendations34567 for identifying fake news. 
In the Enhanced Guidelines condition, participants were also informed that they would view a Facebook 
post about climate change, and they were also asked to consider the same four questions from the 
Guidelines condition. But, participants in this condition were also asked to rate the importance of each 
guideline (on a 1 – 10 scale from not at all important to very important) in terms of its ability to help them 
evaluate the credibility of news online.  
Fake vs. Real News. In total, our study contained six Facebook news posts about climate change, three of 
which were based on fake news with the other three based on real news. Participants were randomly 
assigned to view one of the six posts. The three fake news posts were drawn from three different “hyper-
partisan” media outlets – Breitbart, InfoWars, and Natural News – which are outlets that peddle in 
conspiracy theories, disinformation, and heavy bias in favor of a particular political party or ideology 
(Marwick & Lewis 2017). The three real news posts were drawn from NASA, USA Today, and Scientific 
American.  
                                                        
3 https://www.facebook.com/help/188118808357379 
4 https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/socially-relevant/201711/how-spot-fake-news 
5 https://www.factcheck.org/2016/11/how-to-spot-fake-news/ 
6 https://www.ifla.org/publications/node/11174 
7 https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/primers/fake-news-primer/ 
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Because the online presentation of Facebook posts varies from post to post (e.g., in terms of the number 
of “likes” and “shares”, and the types of emojis applied to content by users), we modified each post to 
ensure consistency in presentation (Figure 1). Thus, in each post shown to participants, the post date, 
number of likes, and number of shares, were identical. However, all of the text and the images in the post 
were as they appeared in the original stories from the three fake news and three real news outlets.  
 
 
Figure 1. The fake news and real news posts used in this experiment. 
Measures 
After reviewing their randomly assigned news post, participants were asked to rate its trustworthiness on 
a 10-point scale from 1 (not at all trustworthy) to 10 (very trustworthy). Participants also rated each post 
in terms of perceived accuracy on a 10-point scale from 1 (not at all accurate) to 10 (very accurate). 
Judged trustworthiness and accuracy were combined to create a single item index variable for trust 
(Chronbach’s alpha = 0.93). Participants were also asked to indicate their likelihood of “liking” or 
“sharing” their assigned post; these responses were collected on an 11-point bi-polar scale from -5 
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(definitely not) to 0 (neutral) to +5 (definitely yes). The scales for “liking” and “sharing” were converted 
to continuous (1-11) scales for data analysis. 
In terms of covariates, participants were asked if they recognized the source of the Facebook post and 
chose between dichotomous response options (yes or no). Next, we determined participants’ knowledge 
level regarding climate change using a 12-item scale used in previous research by us and others (Tobler et 
al. 2012, Shi et al. 2015, Shi et al. 2016). In our study, one item of the scale was accidentally omitted. The 
scale included three subscales representing three different forms of knowledge: knowledge about physical 
characteristics measured fundamental knowledge about the physics underlying climate change, 
knowledge about the causes of climate change assessed the reasons that climate change is happening, and 
knowledge about the consequences of climate change included items about the different natural hazards 
and environmental effects of climate change. Then, because of increasing public concern and regulator 
scrutiny regarding Facebook’s role in the spread of disinformation as well as the company’s handling of 
consumer data and privacy issues, we asked participants to rate their current attitudes toward the platform; 
responses were collected on an 11-point bi-polar scale from -5 (strong negative feelings) to 0 (neutral) to 
+5 (strong positive feelings). Finally, we collected demographic information from participants regarding 
their gender, age, education level, and political orientation (measured from very conservative to moderate 
to very liberal).  
Participants 
Data collection took place in September 2018 using an online Qualtrics panel. The instrument was sent to 
adults ages 18 and over in the United States. Quota sampling was used to balance gender and belief in 
human-caused climate change; roughly 50% of recruited participants believed climate change is human-
caused (labeled “believers”), and 50% did not believe climate change was human-caused or were unsure 
(labeled “doubters”).  
Initially 3,842 participants responded to our instrument. A total of 1,092 participants were removed from 
the sample because they failed attention checks (n = 1,015 deleted), because they completed the 
experiment in less than half the median time (n = 69 deleted), or because they provided gibberish 
responses to a series of open-ended questions, which were not analyzed (n = 8 deleted). This left us with a 
final sample of 2,750 participants. 
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RESULTS 
When looking at each dependent measure across the combined fake news and real news post types, 
participants reported lower ratings for trust, liking, and sharing when confronted with posts based on fake 
news as compared to real news (Table 1).  
Table 1. Mean ratings of perceived trustworthiness, likelihood of “liking,”, and likelihood of “sharing” 
across post type (fake news and real news). 
 
We conducted a two-way ANOVA to measure the effect of condition and post type (fake vs. real news) 
on the dependent measures. In addition, we used multiple linear regressions to more thoroughly study the 
effect of condition on the dependent measures when controlling for our covariates. We conducted 12 
regressions, predicting each of our three dependent measures separately for doubters and believers who 
saw fake or real news. 
An ANOVA detected a significant main effect of post type (F1, 2744 = 710.8, p < 0.001), and a significant 
interaction between post type and condition (F2, 2744 = 4.53, p = 0.011) for the dependent variable 
measuring trust. Here, the effect of condition on trust depended upon whether participants received real or 
fake news. We also detected a significant main effect of post type (F1, 2744 = 275.4, p < 0.001) on “liking”; 
for this variable, the interaction between post type and condition approached, but ultimately was not 
significant (F2, 2744 = 2.7, p < 0.066). For the variable that accounted for “sharing”, the ANOVA detected a 
significant main effect of post type (F1, 2744 = 171.9, p < 0.001), a significant main effect of condition (F2, 
2744 = 3.1, p = 0.047), and a significant interaction between post type and condition (F2, 2744 = 4.53, p = 
0.011); thus, participants’ likelihood of sharing a Facebook post was influenced by both condition and 
post type. 
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Table 2. Regression analyses for climate change doubters and believers on perceived trustworthiness of, 
likelihood of “liking”, and likelihood of “sharing” posts based on fake news. 
 
Participants Shown Fake News 
Linear regression analyses for the posts based on fake news (Table 2) indicated that climate change 
doubters exposed to the Guidelines condition were less likely to trust (η2p = 0.011) and like (η2p  = 0.009) 
them. Doubters in Enhanced Guidelines condition were less likely to like (η2p = 0.012) and share (η2p = 
0.006) posts based on fake news. Climate change believers exposed to the Guidelines condition were, by 
contrast, less likely to share (η2p = 0.009) posts based on fake news, while exposure to the Enhanced 
Guidelines condition led believers to be less likely to trust (η2p = 0.008) and share (η2p = 0.019) posts 
based on fake climate news.  
When controlling for the other covariates, participants’ ability to recognize the sources of posts based on 
fake news also influenced their responses to the dependent measures (Table 2). Specifically, participants 
who were climate change doubters and who recognized either Breitbart or Natural News as sources of a 
fake news post were more likely to trust, like, and share it. Climate change believers, by contrast, were 
more likely to trust, like, and share a fake news post if they recognized Natural News as the source.  
Beyond recognizing the source, and when controlling for other covariates, higher levels of domain-
specific knowledge about climate change (Table 2) led believers to report lower levels of trust, and a 
lower likelihood of liking and sharing posts based on fake news. Higher levels of domain-specific 
knowledge had no significant effect on trusting, liking, and sharing amongst climate change doubters.  
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For both doubters and believers, the more positive a participant’s attitude toward Facebook (Table 2), the 
more likely they were to trust, like, and share a post based on fake news. And, in terms of political 
orientation, doubters who self-identified as being more conservative were more likely to like and share 
posts based on fake news; similarly, believers who self-identified as being more conservative reported 
higher levels of trust in, and were more likely to like and share posts based on fake news (Table 2). 
Table 3. Regression analyses for climate change doubters and believers on perceived trustworthiness of, 
likelihood of “liking”, and likelihood of “sharing” posts based on real news. 
Participants Shown Real News 
Linear regression analyses for the posts based on real news (Table 3) showed that, when controlling for 
other covariates, believers of climate change who were exposed to the Guidelines condition were more 
likely to trust (η2p = 0.017) posts based on real climate news. Exposure to the Guidelines or Enhanced 
Guidelines conditions had no effect on doubters of climate change.  
Participants’ ability to recognize the sources of posts based on real news once again influenced their 
responses to the dependent measures (Table 3). For both climate change doubters and believers, 
recognizing the source of a post based on real news was associated with a greater likelihood to trust, like, 
or share the post almost half of the time.  
When controlling for other covariates, higher levels of domain-specific knowledge about climate change 
(Table 3) led doubters to report higher levels of trust, and a higher likelihood of liking and sharing posts 
based on real news. For believers, higher scores on the scale measuring domain-specific knowledge led to 
higher levels of trust in posts based real climate news. 
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As was the case with posts based on fake news, the more positive a doubter’s or believer’s attitude toward 
Facebook (Table 3), the more likely they were to trust, like, and share posts based on real news. And, in 
terms of political orientation, doubters and believers who self-reported higher levels of conservatism were 
less likely to trust and like posts based on real climate news.  
DISCUSSION 
Our study tested the effect of exposure to guidelines (for evaluating the credibility of news online) on a 
person’s likelihood to trust, like, or share real and fake news about climate change on Facebook. We 
tested two conditions and a control. Those in our Guidelines condition read guidelines for evaluating 
news online while participants in our Enhanced Guidelines condition read the same guidelines and rated 
them in terms of how important each guideline would be for evaluating news online. The control group 
was not exposed to guidelines at all. Participants were asked to evaluate either a fake or real Facebook 
news post about climate change. We hypothesized that simply reading guidelines would not be a powerful 
enough intervention to influence a person’s likelihood to trust, like, and share news online; we anticipated 
that the additional rating task would be needed to help participants process the guidelines more deeply, in 
turn making them less likely to trust, like, and share fake news compared to the control. We predicted that 
these interventions would not negatively impact real climate news, i.e., these interventions would not 
make participants less likely to trust, like, and share real news.  
As hypothesized, our results show that participants that saw enhanced guidelines were less likely to trust, 
like, or share fake climate news. Contrary to our hypothesis, participants who only read the guidelines 
were also less likely to trust, like, or share fake news. Both conditions had consistently small effect sizes 
for each dependent variable – trusting, liking, and sharing – meaning neither condition was more effective 
than the other. Encouragingly, these interventions did not reduce a participant’s likelihood to trust, like, or 
share real climate news.  
Prior research has found that those with better analytical thinking capabilities are better able to recognize 
fake news. Pennycook and Rand (2018) found that individuals who scored highly on a reworded version 
of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) (Frederick 2005, Shenhav et al. 2012) as well as a non-numeric 
cognitive reflection test (Thomson and Oppenheimer 2016) were better able to distinguish between fake 
and real news headlines, independent of political ideology. Furthermore, Bronstein et al. (2019) also used 
the same two sets of CRT questions to measure the association between analytical thinking and 
assessment of fake news and found that higher analytical reasoning scores were positively correlated with 
the ability to discern between real and fake news.  
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Consistent with this work, our study again found critical thinking to be an important factor in regard to a 
person’s likelihood to trust, like, and share fake news. However, differences in methodology between 
prior research and our study allow ours to support this theory from another angle. Preceding work 
measured an individual’s innate ability to use critical thinking, and thus examined this ability’s influence 
on detection of fake news. Our study, rather, did not look at innate ability, but instead imposed critical 
thinking on a group of people by asking them to engage in a critical thinking task. Independent of a 
person’s education level, if a person engaged in one of our interventions (compared to the control group) 
they were less likely to trust, like, or share fake news. This, in combination with findings from other 
studies, provides compelling reason to consider the role of critical thinking in a person’s likelihood to 
recognize fake news. 
However, the small effect sizes of the critical thinking interventions in our study are important to note. 
Since the interventions only accounted for a small amount of variation in our model, this suggests other 
factors, in addition to critical thinking, or a lack of critical thinking, may be leading some individuals to 
recognize false information and others to accept it. One of these factors may be a person’s tendency to 
engage in motivated reasoning. Again, prior research has established that when a person is confronted 
with information that is inconsistent with their political beliefs, they may be motivated to reject that 
information, but accept information that is aligned with their political beliefs (Taber and Lodge 2006). 
Our study found that the more conservative a person was, the more likely they were to trust fake climate 
news and reject real climate news. It is possible that more conservative participants found the fake climate 
news to be consistent with their views of climate change and the real climate news to be incongruent with 
their views, which may have led them to engage in motivated reasoning. 
Limitations 
It is again necessary to highlight the small effect sizes of our interventions, this time as a limitation. The 
effect sizes signal to us that exposure to guidelines will not be enough to eliminate the spread of fake 
news in its entirety. However, even if exposure to guidelines only has a small chance of reducing a 
person’s likelihood to trust, like, or share fake news, that small probability could still provoke meaningful 
behavior change if a population as massive as all U.S. internet users were to experience our interventions. 
Additionally, influencing only a small number of people is significant due to the pyramid structure of 
“sharing” on social media – preventing even one person from sharing a fake news post in turn prevents 
many other social media users from encountering the fake news post in the first place.  
Certain aspects of our sample could also be considered a limitation of our study, in that our sample may 
not completely reflect those who typically engage in the spread of fake news. For example, prior research 
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has found that those ages 65 and up share fake news at a higher rate than younger internet users. Although 
our study included many participants over the age of 65 (n = 313), our study did not find an association 
between age and susceptibility to fake news. It is possible that older participants that sign up to take 
online surveys may be technologically savvier than the typical 65-plus social media user. 
Other limitations are related to our study’s design. First, participants were exposed to guidelines 
immediately before they were shown a fake or real news post, so we cannot assume the guidelines would 
have still been influential if time had passed between the intervention and the stimulus. Second, our study 
utilized a limited number of stimuli that may not be representative of the broader category of fake news 
regarding climate change. Moreover, our study only exposed participants to news regarding climate 
change which is not representative of all fake news posts which can cover any topic. Although the 
guidelines we tested did not intend to inoculate internet users against just one form of fake news, i.e. the 
guidelines were not specific to one fake news topic, further research should be conducted to discover if 
our findings could be generalized to other fake news topics as well.  
Finally, the hypothetical nature of conducting a study about fake news on social media off of a social 
media platform may not have completely captured the actions a participant would have taken in reality. 
To address this, future work could assess the effects of embedding these guidelines within an existing 
social media platform.  
Conclusion 
With evidence that exposure to guidelines for evaluating the credibility of news online can help to reduce 
a person’s likelihood to trust, like, and share fake climate news on Facebook, without negatively 
impacting legitimate climate news, further research on these guidelines should be considered. In 
particular, it may be beneficial to explore pathways to bring these guidelines forth to those who are not 
currently seeking them out. Even if these guidelines were successfully shown to the majority of internet 
users, there are still other factors that would need attention in order to effectively fight against fake news 
about climate change, and fake news in general. Two of these factors were included in our study as 
covariates.  
First is the role of an individual’s knowledge of climate change in relation to their susceptibility to anti-
climate messaging and willingness to accept legitimate climate news. In our study, climate believers with 
a greater knowledge of climate change concepts were even less susceptible to fake climate news 
(compared to climate believers that were not as knowledgeable), and climate doubters were more 
accepting of real climate news (compared to other climate doubters). Although there are many recent 
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examples where objective facts related to politicized issues are discounted or ignored (Beck 2017), our 
results show that in the context of climate change, understanding relevant facts is influential even when 
they conflict with a person’s beliefs. Or, even though some participants doubted climate change, if they 
had some accurate knowledge about climate change, they were more likely to accept legitimate climate 
news. This suggests that it is important to continue to explore the role of climate education in terms of 
addressing the disinformation that still surrounds this global issue. 
Second is the role of a person’s attitude toward Facebook – regardless of whether a participant was a 
doubter or believer of climate change, or saw real or fake news, if they had positive feelings toward 
Facebook, they were more likely to trust, like, and share whatever information they were shown. 
Although an intuitive finding, this suggests that Facebook users are not being as critical of the 
information they encounter if they like the platform. Further research may seek to understand how to 
encourage healthy skepticism toward the platform. 
Overall, this study highlights the potential of guidelines to play an important role in combating fake news 
online. And additionally, this study suggests many opportunities to further explore other factors that 
influence a person’s likelihood to detect fake news. Although this progress is meaningful, fully 
eliminating fake news from social media will likely require a solution far grander than simply reading or 
interacting with guidelines for evaluating news online, and future research should pursue solutions far 
more creative than what has been done before.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17 
References 
Allcott, H., and M. Gentzkow. 2017. Social media and fake news in the 2016 election. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 31:211-236. 
Beck, J. 2017. This Article Won’t Change Your Mind. The Atlantic. 
Bessette, D. L., R. S. Wilson, and J. L. Arvai. 2019. Do people disagree with themselves? Exploring the 
internal consistency of complex, unfamiliar, and risky decisions. Journal of Risk Research:1-13. 
Bronstein, M. V., G. Pennycook, A. Bear, D. G. Rand, and T. D. Cannon. 2019. Belief in fake news is 
associated with delusionality, dogmatism, religious fundamentalism, and reduced analytic thinking. 
Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 8:108-117. 
Farrell, J., K. McConnell, and R. Brulle. 2019. Evidence-based strategies to combat scientific 
misinformation. Nature Climate Change 9:191-195. 
Frederick, S. 2005. Cognitive reflection and decision making. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 
19:25-42. 
Gregory, R., T. Satterfield, and A. Hasell. 2016. Using decision pathway surveys to inform climate 
engineering policy choices. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America 113:560-565. 
Grinberg, N., K. Joseph, L. Friedland, B. Swire-Thompson, and D. Lazer. 2019. Fake news on Twitter 
during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Science 363:374-378. 
Guess, A., B. Nyhan, and J. Reifler. 2018. Selective exposure to misinformation: Evidence from the 
consumption of fake news during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign. Working Paper. 
Kunda, Z. 1990. The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin 108:480-498. 
Lazer, D. M. J., M. A. Baum, Y. Benkler, A. J. Berinsky, K. M. Greenhill, F. Menczer, M. J. Metzger, B. 
Nyhan, G. Pennycook, D. Rothschild, M. Schudson, S. A. Sloman, C. R. Sunstein, E. A. Thorson, D. J. 
Watts, and J. L. Zittrain. 2018. The science of fake news. Science 359:1094. 
Nir, L. 2011. Motivated reasoning and public opinion perception. Public Opinion Quarterly 75:504-532. 
Pennycook, G., and D. G. Rand. 2018. Lazy, not biased: Susceptibility to partisan fake news is better 
explained by lack of reasoning than by motivated reasoning. Cognition In press. 
Shearer, E., and J. Gottfried. 2017. News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2017. Pew Research Center. 
Shenhav, A., D. G. Rand, and J. D. Greene. 2012. Divine intuition: cognitive style influences belief in 
God. Journal of experimental psychology. General 141:423-428. 
Shi, J., V. H. M. Visschers, and M. Siegrist. 2015. Public perception of climate change: The importance 
of knowledge and cultural worldviews. Risk Analysis 35:2183-2201. 
Shi, J., V. H. M. Visschers, M. Siegrist, and J. Arvai. 2016. Knowledge as a driver of public perceptions 
about climate change reassessed. Nature Climate Change 6:759-762. 
 18 
Taber, C. S., and M. Lodge. 2006. Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs. American 
Journal of Political Science 50:755-769. 
Thomson, K. S., and D. M. Oppenheimer. 2016. Investigating an alternate form of the cognitive reflection 
test. Judgment and Decision Making 11:99-113. 
Tobler, C., V. H. Visschers, and M. Siegrist. 2012. Consumers’ knowledge about climate change. 
Climatic Change 114:189-209. 
 
 
 
 
